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Abstract
Theories of wage rigidity often rely on a positive relationship between pay changes
and utility, arising from concern for fairness or gift exchange. Supportive evidence has
emerged from laboratory experiments, but the link has not yet been established with
eld data. This paper contributes a rst step, using representative British data. Workers
care about the level and the growth of earnings. Below-median wage increases lead to an
insult e¤ect except when similar workers have real wage reductions or rm production
is falling. Nominal pay cuts appear insulting even when the rm is doing badly.
Keywords: Pay cuts, Social comparisons, Gift exchange
JEL classication: J33, M52, J28, E24
* I am grateful to Nils Gottfries, two anonymous referees, Chris Doyle, Barry Smith,
Jeremy Smith, participants at the Royal Economic Society Conference 2013 and EALE-
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I. Introduction
Wage dynamics are complex: micro data reveal notable heterogeneity, with signicant
nominal or real rigidity for some coexisting with apparent exibility for others (e.g.
Dickens et al. 2007; Smith 2000). At present the foundations for wage rigidity are
poorly understood. Here I examine the extent to which wage dynamics are consistent
with a model of wage-setting based on fairness, where workersutility depends on how
their own income compares with some reference income.
There is strong evidence from laboratory experiments that fairness considerations
drive participantsreactions to wages and wage changes, and surveys of managers con-
sistently report concern for workersmorale when setting wages (Fehr et al. 1993, 2009;
Blinder and Choi 1990; Agell and Lundborg 1995, 2003; Campbell and Kamlani 1997;
Bewley 1999). However, the link between wage rigidity and potential fairness founda-
tions has not yet been established with eld data. Using British eld data from 1991
to 2007, I examine the impact of compensation and, in particular, changes in compen-
sation, on job satisfaction. Three questions are addressed: Does job satisfaction depend
on the change in pay in addition to the level of pay? If so, does the e¤ect of a pay change
di¤er between increases and decreases (either real or nominal)? Does satisfaction with
pay changes depend on what is happening elsewhere?
Few researchers have investigated the impact on job satisfaction of pay changes.
British, German and Japanese eld data have been analysed by Clark (1999), Grund
and Sliwka (2007) and Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2007) respectively, but these studies
were limited in scope and do not allow robust detailed conclusions to be drawn about
the e¤ect of pay cuts. Performance declines were found after a pay change lossby Mas
(2006) and to some extent by Lee and Rupp (2007), using data on specic employee
groups (police and pilots respectively).
A small but growing number of eld experiments have also examined the relationship
between wage, fairness and e¤ort. The detrimental e¤ect of downward deviation from
a reference point is a reasonably consistent result. Findings are more mixed concerning
the e¤ect of a rise above the reference point (e.g. Kube et al. 2010; Cohn et al. 2013).
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Recent experimental investigations have also unearthed sources of heterogeneity in
reactions to pay changes stemming from comparisons with other workers (Cohn et al.
2011), rm protability (Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2011), perceived pay fairness (Cohn et
al. 2013) and expectations (Abeler et al. 2011). I examine whether these ndings carry
over into representative naturaleld data.
This study shows that pay growth has a positive impact on job satisfaction, consistent
with explanations for downward wage rigidity based on fairness, such as Akerlofs (1982)
gift exchange model. If earnings are cut, job satisfaction su¤ers even more than would
be expected given the general pay growth impact; indeed, there is a step reduction in job
satisfaction Bewleys (1999) insult e¤ect. This reduction in satisfaction occurs once
earnings growth falls below the median, implying that employers need to keep earnings
growth at or above average to avoid damaging workforce morale.
Comparisons with the rm and comparisons with salient others a¤ect reaction to a
given pay change by determining whether an insultis felt. If comparison pay falls, a
rm could get away with a real but not nominal pay cut without a step reduction in
morale, even if its output is rising. If the pay of similar other workers increases, such a
pay cut would have an insult e¤ectif the rms output is rising, but not if it is falling.
No matter how badly the rm is doing, nominal cuts cause a step decline in morale,
unless other workers are also experiencing pay cuts. Thus, results provide particular
motivation for downward nominal rigidity.
II. Data and method
Data are drawn from the rst 17 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. The
BHPS contains quite rich data on job satisfaction, individual and job characteristics,
earnings, and from 1999 also basic hourly wage. These data are supplemented by in-
dustry performance information from the UK O¢ ce for National Statistics, regional
unemployment and aggregate prices (see the Data Appendix for details).
Overall job satisfaction is chosen as the best measure of worker morale (which, accord-
ing to Akerlofs (1982) gift exchange theory, will be a¤ected by pay level and changes).
Bewley (1999) identied three components of morale: identication with the rms ob-
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jectives; belief in positive reciprocation (gift exchange); and a mood conducive to good
work. Job satisfaction is likely related to all of these. An individual reports their job
satisfaction in the BHPS by choosing one of seven categories, ranging from not at all
to completelysatised.
Results are reported for wage rate and earnings. Both might be relevant in terms
of fairness. For hourly-paid workers, the basic hourly wage rate (excluding variable
components such as bonuses) is generally thought most relevant: it comes close to the
ideal of capturing the wage that is the focus of the employment contract (Bewley 1999,
Dickens et al. 2007). For salaried workers, an hourly earnings measure can be calcu-
lated by dividing usual salary by usual hours, but this has the disadvantage that it is
particularly subject to measurement error stemming from incorrectly-measured hours
of work (see Bound et al. 2001). This suggests that total earnings might be the best
available measure for salaried workers and indeed this is often used in job satisfaction
studies (Clark et al. 2008). Here, current and past weekly hours of work are included
separately as control variables, so coe¢ cients on weekly earnings and its growth could
be reformulated into those that would obtain if hourly earnings were used.
Following the precedent of the International Wage Flexibility Network (Dickens et
al. 2007), I trim pay data to remove large changes likely due to error. Nominal earnings
growth below -85% and above 100% and hourly wage rate growth below -35% and above
60% are discarded. As is commonly found, such trimming actually makes no di¤erence
to results. On average, 17% of basic hourly wage changes involve nominal freezes and
14% involve nominal cuts. 13% of hourly wage changes feature nominal raises that do
not raise hourly wages in real terms. The remaining 56% enjoy real raises. Figures for
earnings are 7% freezes, 29% nominal cuts, 8% between nominal and real zero percentage
change, and 56% real raises. The extra volatility in earnings growth reects the fact it
includes more exible pay components (overtime and bonuses).1
1The extent of pay cuts may appear surprising, not least because under UK employment law, em-
ployers cannot unilaterally cut an employees pay. An employer who forces a pay cut on an unwilling
employee could be subject to a claim against them for breach of contract. However, in their defence,
the employer could legally use evidence that there are genuine business or economic reasons why the
cut has to be forced upon the employee, meaning that in practice the law does not prevent warranted
cuts.
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Because the focus of this study is the reaction of workersjob satisfaction to changes
in pay, the sample is restricted to job stayers who had no job change of any sort
since their last interview. Unusually, and benecially for this study, the BHPS allows
job change to be dened so as to encompass promotions and grade changes, as well as
changes of employer. The sample is restricted further to ensure that, as far as possible,
there are no changes in job conditions. It is important to control for or exclude changes
in work conditions because pay changes may compensatefor these, with the result that
overall job satisfaction appears unresponsive to pay variation. The aim here is to isolate
the satisfaction response to uncompensated changes in pay.
Controls include variables that are standard in satisfaction equations and others less
commonly included. These variables are included to capture systematic factors ren-
dering an individual happier or otherwise. Controls include a quadratic in age, gender
dummy, three ethnic status dummies, four marital status dummies, number of children
aged 16 or below, a dummy for health problems, three education dummies and the log
of real non-labour income. Macroeconomic and local labour market conditions are con-
trolled for by the use of year dummies (fteen for earnings and seven for wage rate) and
eleven region dummies. I investigate quadratics in tenure and actual work experience
(with dummies for missing values). Other job-related controls include nine occupation
dummies and seventeen industry dummies, travel-to-work time in hours, nine dummies
for workplace employment size, and a dummy for the presence of an employer pension
scheme. Framing e¤ectsare known to be important in subjective data such as satisfac-
tion. Conti and Pudney (2008) demonstrated that reported job satisfaction is sensitive
to interview-related factors, so I control for presence at interview of the respondents
children or partner and whether the respondents cooperation during the interview was
judged not good. A general-to-specic method is used to determine nal specications
for each pay measure.
Turning to the econometric method, most of the empirical work in this paper uses
a xed e¤ects model, and I calculate robust standard errors allowing for clustering at
the individual worker level. There are at least two good reasons for using a xed e¤ects
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model in the present context. First, I am interested in the e¤ects of income and income
changes on individual wellbeing, rather than comparisons across individuals. Second,
using the xed e¤ects model goes some way to control for possible endogeneity of pay.
By controlling for xed e¤ects I control for individualsinherent tendency to be happy
(have a positive attitude or motivation). Therefore, to the extent that it is this xed
inherent attitude that is correlated with pay and pay growth, controlling for xed e¤ects
removes this possible source of endogeneity. I also estimate selection models that control
for endogenous job changes. To estimate these relatively complex models I make use
of the POLS (probit-adjusted OLS) estimator for ordered variables developed by van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008). POLS uses the typical assumption that underlying
the observed categorical, ordered, job satisfaction variable is an unobserved continuous
and normally-distributed latent job satisfaction variable. Under POLS the sample prob-
ability of satisfaction falling in each category is calculated. Then, by assuming that the
natural log of the latent tendency to be satised follows a normal distribution, these
probabilities are used to back outthe underlying latent tendency to be satised, which
is the variable of interest. For each sample proportion, the POLS dependent variable 
the approximated latent tendency takes the value of the mean over the interval into
which the sample proportion falls. POLS and ordered probit give very similar results,
subject to a scaling factor (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2008). POLS is far less
time-consuming to implement, and enables richer models such as those allowing for
xed e¤ects and selection to be estimated easily.
III. Results
Job satisfaction, pay, pay growth, and hours
Table 1 presents coe¢ cients on pay variables resulting from estimation of a xed e¤ects
model of job satisfaction for job stayers whose job conditions do not change. These
equations include controls for a wide range of demographic, macroeconomic, interview-
and job-related variables (see Section II). As discussed above, two key pay variables are
used: log real usual gross weekly earnings (available for hourly-paid and salaried workers
from 1991) and log real basic hourly wage rate (applicable for hourly-paid workers and
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collected from 1999).2
Columns (1) and (3) include only the level of pay (plus controls), and conrm that
pay is positively related to overall job satisfaction. Real pay has a positive impact even
controlling for current real pay and lagged hours (columns (2) and (4); the dynamic
e¤ect of real basic wage rate growth is signicant at the 7% level).
Real raises make people happier, and the larger the raise the greater the happiness
improvement, consistent with past income levels acting as a referent. Rearranging, the
coe¢ cients indicate that current earnings increase job satisfaction faster than lagged
earnings reduce it (e¤ects 0:227 and  0:084), and a similar adaptationrate is found for
hourly wages (a current wage e¤ect of 0:625 compares to a lagged coe¢ cient of  0:212).
The signicant e¤ects of lagged wage and earnings have important implications for
theories of wage rigidity. These results provide evidence that workersjob satisfaction
su¤ers if pay falls below last periods level, and are consistent with a version of Akerlofs
(1982) gift exchange hypothesis in which the relevant reference income is own past pay.
This could explain why employers are reluctant to cut wages, since the resulting loss in
satisfaction may lead to a demotivated and unproductive workforce.
In the remainder of this paper I examine the robustness of this result, including
testing whether the result is uniform over the whole range of pay growth rates and over
all individuals at all times. It would not be surprising, intuitively and theoretically, if
workersreference income and the importance they place on it varied over di¤erent
situations. If this is true, and if we could identify how reference income changed, then
it would be possible to discern the conditions under which wage cuts are more likely.
Total weekly hours of work (the sum of normal standard and normal overtime hours)
and change in weekly hours have no e¤ect on job satisfaction for hourly-paid workers,
once other factors are controlled for (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). In contrast, total
weekly hours do have an impact when weekly earnings are the pay variable: in this case,
both current and lagged log weekly hours negatively a¤ect job satisfaction. The negative
2The use of time dummies means most results are identical whether real or nominal values are
used. When analysing nonlinearities, the analysis distinguishes between real and nominal phenomena,
providing evidence on whether workersmorale relates to real or nominal wage rigidity.
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signs are consistent with hourly pay mattering, but the negative hours e¤ects appear
bigger than would be warranted if this were the only role of hours.
Relationships between job satisfaction and control variables are similar to those found
previously, subject to the caveats that most of the literature has estimated ordered probit
rather than xed e¤ects models and that signicance varies across pay measures. Job
satisfaction tends to be lower among those with poor health (Clark and Oswald 1996).
A negative coe¢ cient on squared job tenure implies an inverse-U-shaped relationship
between tenure and satisfaction (Theodossiou and Zangelidis 2009). (However, once xed
e¤ects are included, the standard ordered probit or linear regression result of a U-shaped
satisfaction-age relationship seems to vanish.) Presence of partner at the interview
(dont show your partner how satised you are) and poor interview cooperation are
associated with lower reported job satisfaction (as in Conti and Pudney 2008). Job
satisfaction rises with the number of children. Given that the worker is in the same job,
they are happier if their establishment is in the smallest employment size category (1-2
workers). Year dummies are signicant and, particularly for hourly-paid workers, show
a declining trend in job satisfaction over time.
Is there nonlinearity in the job satisfactionpay growth relationship?
Bewley (1999) suggested that workers feel insultedif a pay award falls below an ex-
pected or reference level that embodies workersnotion of fairness. The insultcauses
a step change, or jump, in satisfaction once the reference level is reached. Loss aversion
and diminishing marginal utility, however, would suggest looking for breaks in the slope,
rather than the intercept, of the satisfactionpay growth relationship. If past pay consti-
tutes a reference point, loss aversion would be reected in a steeper job satisfaction-wage
growth relationship for wage growth below zero than above, so 0% would form a slope
break point. A 0% break point is supported by early experiments on monetary gambles
and on emotional responses to nominal cuts (e.g. Goette and Hu¤man 2007). But, out-
side the laboratory, people may pay attention to the rise in prices, so the kinkmight
occur at real zero. Loss aversion might also be felt in relation to other reference points,
such as the pay level of other workers, or expected pay (Abeler et al., 2011).
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Because theories suggest a number of alternative nonlinearities in the relationship
between satisfaction and pay growth, it is desirable to adopt a exible method of de-
termining whether and where nonlinearities arise. In cases where the location of breaks
are not known for certain a priori, Bai and Perron (1998) and Andrews (1993) suggest
a simple grid searchover a range of break point candidates. At each possible break
point, a Chow-type structural change test is conducted. Here, the test is for partial
structural change involving a threshold model (Bai and Perron 2003). The test investi-
gates whether either, or both, the intercept or the slope of the satisfactionpay growth
relationship varies with the level of pay growth. F statistics testing the null hypothesis of
no break at each value of pay growth were calculated, in steps of 0.1 percentage point.3
Andrews (1993) and Bai and Perron (1998) provide critical values to judge whether
the relationship is signicantly non-linear. In the case of signicant nonlinearity, the
breakpoint is located at pay growth value corresponding to the maximal test statistic
(termed the SupF statistic, after Andrews 1993). The test can be extended to the case
of multiple breaks (Bai and Perron 1998).
Testing separately and jointly for breaks in the level and slope of the satisfaction
earnings growth relationship indicates that level and slope breaks do occur, at di¤erent
values of earnings growth. For earnings, the supremum of the F -statistics testing inter-
cept constancy locates an intercept break at 1:5%, which happens to be median earnings
growth. This break is a signicant one (SupF statistic 27:30, 1% critical value 13:58;
see Table 2 and Figure 1). A break in slope is not identied in the region of nominal
or real zero pay growth,4 thus giving little support to theories of loss aversion related
to nominal or real pay cuts. A change in the behaviour of job satisfaction is found
3The tests use the xed e¤ects model and assume all other coe¢ cients to be constant. Trimming
(exclusion of sample endpoints) must be conducted as test statistics tend to innity towards the end of
the sample. The SupF critical values di¤er according to the proportion of the sample over which the
test is conducted, and are obtained from Andrews (1993) or Bai and Perron (1998). 5% trimming is
applied (as in Bai and Perron 1998). Andrews (1993) shows that it is in fact possible to use the same
critical values to detect breaks within the rst 5% of the earnings sample, because the critical values
depend on the ratio of the proportions trimmed at begining and end,  = 2 (1  1)/ [1 (1  2)], so
a critical value for 1 = 2 = 0:05 also applies to 1 = 0:01; 2 = 0:785, for example. The sample size
of nearly 45; 000 means that tests will have reasonable size and power that close to the beginning of the
sample (ordered in terms of earnings growth).
4F statistics lie between 8 and 9 in this region, compared to a 5% critical value of 9:63, and do not
represent global or local maxima.
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close to where pay growth falls by a quarter. Specically, at pay growth of  24:1%, F
statistics for a break in slope peak (see Table 2). Just under 5% of the sample have
pay growth lower than  24:1%, and this is not a result of economic consequence, but it
proves statistically important to control for the change in satisfaction with pay growth
below this point. For lower pay growth, unexpectedly, the slope of the relationship is
less steep; indeed, satisfaction apparently rises as earnings cuts get larger (recall that
this is controlling for hours changes and observable changes in job characteristics). This
is, of course, surprising but was actually evident in Clarks (1999) results: he reported
that average job satisfaction dropped as pay rose from the lowest to the second-lowest
quintile, and the percentage highly satisedwas also bigger in the lowest quintile than
in the middle quintile.
The very di¤erent locations of the SupF statistics in the separate tests for breaks
in intercept and slope indicate that it would be incorrect to test for a simultaneous
change in both.5 To ensure robustness of detected breaks, bi-directional sequential tests
were undertaken, using the F ( l + 1j l) test of Bai and Perron (1998). Imposing the
intercept break at 1:5%, a break in slope was detected at  24:1%, and when a slope
break was imposed at  24:1%, an intercept break was detected at 1:5% (see Table 2).
The break at  24:1% pay growth could equally well be characterised as a break in
slope or a break in intercept: a sequential test for a second intercept break, imposing
a rst intercept break at 1:5%, conrmed a second intercept break at  24:1%, with
a very similar SupF statistic to the sequential test for a second break in the form of
slope change. Investigation revealed no evidence whatsoever of further breaks, with F
statistics not rising above 5 thoughout the sample, compared with a 10% critical value of
10:45 for a sequentially detected third break (Table 2 does not report these insignicant
results of tests for a third break).
5If the restriction that both intercept and slope break together is imposed, a break signicant at
the 1% level (F statistic 18:45, 1% critical value 16:64) is detected at 1:0% pay growth close to the
detected intercept break, which reects the fact that this is the dominant break. (Bai and Perron
1998 show that the estimate of the break location in a single structural change regression applied to
data that contain two breaks converges to one of the two true break locations.) Figures plotting this
and the other nonlinearity test results reported in this section are available in a web Appendix at
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jennifersmith.
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Results for hourly basic wage rate di¤er from those for total earnings. No signicant
nonlinearity is detectable in the satisfactionbasic wage rate growth relationship (see
Table 2). Thus the relationship is simply the linear one described in Table 1, in which
the positive inuence of hourly wage growth on satisfaction is consistent with a gift
exchange model with past pay acting as a reference point.
The SupF test methodology is atheoretic but, by estimating a model of the satisfaction
earnings growth relationship in which the detected nonlinearities are imposed, theoretical
conclusions can be drawn. Below-median earnings growth induces a step changein job
satisfaction: satisfaction is lower by an average of 4:2% (see column 1 of Table 3).6 This
strong result accords with the importance Bewley (1999) attributed to the insult ef-
fect. It also mirrors the Vince Lombardi e¤ectdescribed by Mas (2006), named after a
professional football coach who said that winning isnt everything, its the only thing.
The insulte¤ect is statistically strong, and it is also not small, relative to other
e¤ects. The reduction in job satisfaction when pay growth is below median is more
than one and a half times greater than the detrimental e¤ect from a health problem, for
example.7
The insult e¤ect could be interpreted in terms of a gift exchange model: the nonlin-
ear e¤ect could reect a reference point at median pay growth, such that workers feel
particularly aggrieved if they get anything less than this average rate. This median pay
growth reference point acts in addition to the reference point e¤ect of lagged own pay
(captured in the linear pay growth term). The step change at the median accounts for a
good deal of the impact of pay growth on satisfaction. Once it is explicitly incorporated,
the economic size and statistical signicance of the continuous increase in satisfaction
with higher pay growth is reduced. A one percentage point rise in earnings growth (not
entailing a rise from below- to above-median) is now estimated to increase satisfaction
6Although this represents an asymmetry, it is not strictly speaking a loss aversion e¤ect since it
does not reect a steeper relationship slope for losses. The fact that in these eld data the form of the
utility loss can be identied illuminates experimental ndings, which are unable to make a slope- versus
step-change distinction as they are typically based on very few (and often one) pay cut.
7The coe¢ cient of  0:027 on a dummy taking value 1 when the individual reports health problems
is signicant at the 3% level. Health problems covered include problems such as arthritis with arms,
legs, hands, feet, back or neck, sight, hearing, skin, allergies, chest/breathing, heart/blood pressure,
stomach/digestion, diabetes.
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by around 6%, an e¤ect just signicant at the 10% level.
Theory and intuition suggest further points of the pay growth distribution worthy of
more detailed investigation points that relate to pay rigidity and pay cuts. Is it really
the case that nominal cuts are no worse than any other below-median raise? Bewleys
(1999) evidence, among others, highlighted the particular morale-reducing impact of
nominal cuts. This implies that (especially nominal) rigidity and raises should lead to
a smaller reduction in satisfaction than nominal cuts. However, results in column 2 of
Table 3 suggest that there is no signicant di¤erence in satisfaction over the range of
pay changes below the median: satisfaction is the same among those who have nominal
cuts, nominal freezes, real cuts involving nominal raises, and below-median real raises
(p = 0:71 in a Wald test of identical dummy coe¢ cients, the largest negative coe¢ cient
being on nominal freezes). Any reduction in earnings growth below the median reduces
satisfaction, relative to those with above-median earnings growth.8
Why is the median important? The importance of the median could reect the
inuence of social comparisons, since it captures average pay growth of other workers.
Further investigation into external comparisons is undertaken in the following section.
Social preferences
I examine the e¤ect of social comparisons with similar other workers, and whether and
how social concerns interact with the morale e¤ects of wage dynamics. Salient others are
dened in a similar way to Layard et al. (2009) and others: in terms of mean by gender,
three education groups and four age groups, resulting in 24 di¤erent comparison-pay
values.9 Two hypotheses are investigated. First, does comparison pay form a reference
8Table 3 documents only possible nonlinearities below the median. Changes above the median
were investigated, but no deviation from a linear satisfactionearnings growth relationship was found,
consistent with SupF results. The existence of a below-median insult e¤ect was also explored for
hourly wages. Although there was a similar pattern of negative coe¢ cients on below-median wage
growth dummies, e¤ects were insignicant, consistent with the lack of nonlinearity in the satisfaction
hourly wage growth relationship detectable via SupF -type tests. Further research into the di¤erence
in satisfaction responses between earnings and hourly wage  for example, with a larger dataset on
hourly wages, or one that enabled a full examination of non-basic wage components of earnings would
undoubtedly be useful.
9Results using this denition of comparison pay are very similar to those obtained if, instead of
gender, (eleven) regions are used to dene comparison groups (along the lines of Ferrer-i-Carbonell
2005).
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point, thus directly and negatively a¤ecting workerssatisfaction? Second, are pay cuts
and below-median pay growth generally (more) acceptable if similar others are also
experiencing real cuts? Cohn et al. (2011) found just this in a eld experiment.10
Bewley (1999), among others, emphasised comparisons with the rm: his interview
evidence indicated that workers might accept pay cuts if their rm or industry is doing
particularly badly (see also Kahneman et al. 1986). Workers might believe that by
taking a pay cut they can preserve their jobs (or their rm). An alternative rationale
relies on workers essentially making comparisons with rm performance when assessing
satisfaction with pay, and indulging in gift exchange (Akerlof 1982). Workers would be
willing to sacrice pay if the rms performance is poor, but would be disgruntled to
have the same cut forced on them if the rm is doing well. To test these hypotheses, I
di¤erentiate according to rm performance using a dummy distinguishing whether the
individuals industry output rises or falls in real terms (the data are disaggregated into
33 industries for this purpose). Just over one fth of observations relate to industries
where output falls.
For clarity, I rst look separately at each comparison with the rm and with other
workers  and then allow them to interact, to investigate how workers react to the
existence of multiple referents.
Does otherspay act as a reference point? When xed e¤ects are used, as preferred, it
appears not (see columns 2 and 6 of Table 4). The estimation method matters: in an or-
dered probit, the pay of similar others is estimated to have a substantial negative impact
on job satisfaction, consistent with it playing a reference point role (columns 1 and 5).
However, this comparison income e¤ect is wiped out by the inclusion of time-invariant
individual characteristics (xed e¤ects, gender, education and age). Several interpre-
tations are possible, but the most likely is that there is insu¢ cient within-individual
variation in the level of comparison pay for a signicant e¤ect to be estimated. For
10Intuition and theory provide strong grounds for dividing otherspay growth into real raises and
real cuts, and the importance of real zero was conrmed by an atheoretic grid-search over possible
break points (similar to the SupF tests above) which conrmed that 0% was the most likely candidate.
Comparison earnings fall in real terms in around 5% of cases. No reference pointe¤ect was found from
the growth rate of otherspay and the change in real industry output: they have no signicant direct
impact.
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earnings, for example, within-individual variance of comparison pay accounts for less
than 9% of total variance. Because of the advantages of xed e¤ects in substantially
removing endogeneity problems, I will proceed using this estimation method (and there-
fore exclude the level of comparison pay) but it is useful to bear in mind that the xed
e¤ects could be interpreted as capturing the substantial inuence of social comparison
with otherspay level.
Do workers always look to past pay as a reference point, or only under some cir-
cumstances? Interacting lagged own pay (pay growth) with dummies capturing rm
performance and rate of growth of otherspay reveals that the reference point of past
pay is robust: its negative impact on satisfaction does not vary much in relation to what
is happening elsewhere (columns 3, 4 and 7 of Table 4).11 However, the e¤ect of own
lagged pay is insignicant at the 10% level when otherspay is falling (column 4), which
could be taken to imply that workers tend to focus more on their own pay growth when
otherspay is also growing (indicating a desire to keep up with the Joneses).
Results show that whether an insultis felt upon earnings growth falling below the
median depends on social comparisons. A step reduction in satisfaction is only felt if
comparison earnings rise (see column 4 of Table 4). If others are also experiencing cuts,
then low pay growth is more acceptable. But an insult e¤ect is apparent whether the
industry is expanding or contracting (column 3) a result not supportive of Bewleys
(1999) contention that poor rm performance excuses cuts.
Table 5 investigates the insult e¤ect of below-median earnings growth further, with
two aims: to investigate the interaction between the two social comparisons (with rm
and other workers), and to see whether nominal cuts are treated just like any other
low pay growth. Distinguishing categories of low pay growth (column 2 of Table 5)
shows that interactions between referents matter: it is only when others are enjoying
real raises and industry output is rising that workers exhibit insultunhappiness with
11In order to constrain the e¤ect of workerscurrent pay to be constant while examining interactions
of the their past pay with social comparisons, it is necessary to substitute own pay growth with lagged
own pay. The two are interchangeable: the negative of the coe¢ cient on lagged pay gives the e¤ect of
pay growth. Falls in comparison pay can only be investigated for earnings because there are insu¢ cient
cuts in comparison hourly wage (the average hourly wage over age-education-gender cells).
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freezes, nominal raises and other below-median pay growth involving small real cuts
(but not nominal cuts). This is a fairly uniform impact,12 taking the form of a step
reduction in satisfaction of around 5% if own pay growth is low while similar otherspay
and rm performance are both rising. It is noteworthy that if industry output declines,
or if otherspay is falling, no insult e¤ect accompanies low pay growth (above a nominal
cut).
Nominal cuts are a special case. The reaction to nominal cuts does not seem to be
inuenced by fairness in the form of reference to rm performance. Workers are unhappy
with nominal cuts if others are enjoying raises, whether their industry is expanding or
declining. These ndings therefore provide particular motivation for downward nominal
wage rigidity. Nominal cuts are the most numerous of the four below-median categories,
so using a below-median pay growth dummy reects the pattern of results for nominal
cuts (see column 1 of Table 5). Overall, these disaggregated results conrm the impor-
tance of the median, rst uncovered in the SupF tests. What the SupF tests could
not reveal, of course, was that the below-median di¤erence only applied under certain
conditions.
In summary, the fairness of own pay growth appears to be judged against otherspay
growth. Furthermore, results imply that it is not just horizontal equity equity across
similar workers that matters, but also verticalequity with the rm. The behaviour
of job satisfaction in relation to whether pay changes meet this multifaceted reference
point is consistent with a gift exchange model embodying an insult e¤ect. Comparisons
with other workers and with the rm both appear to matter equally to workers as they
react to low pay changes, apart from the special case of nominal cuts, where comparisons
with other workers are dominant in determining morale e¤ects.
Results have clear implications for compensation policy. Firms whose performance
is improving need to avoid any cut in real earnings in order to maintain morale unless
other similar workers are experiencing pay cuts. A rm whose performance is declining
12In a Wald test, equal coe¢ cients cannot be rejected, with a p-value of 0.56. All interaction e¤ects
are relative to the base of above-median pay growth, average industry output growth and average pay
growth for similar other workers.
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could impose a small real earnings cut whatever is happening to other workerspay
without any extra adverse morale impact above and beyond the normalresponse of
satisfaction to pay growth, as long as nominal cuts were avoided. Nominal cuts are a
special case, in that even if the rm is in dire straits, they would adversely a¤ect morale
through an insult e¤ect, unless other workers are experiencing cuts.
Robustness checks
Robustness checks were carried out to ensure the results were not driven by sample
selection or measurement error.13
Perhaps the sample of workers continuing in their jobs is selected, because the
prospect of pay cuts leads to turnover concentrated among most able workers. Such
endogenous turnover is certainly feared by employers (Bewley, 1999). If remaining lower-
ability workers are relatively satised with the reduced income (as they have lower ex-
pectations or reference points), results would underestimate the average adverse impact
of cuts. However, there is some evidence that relative losses do not induce quits: Mas
(2006) nds no change in police employment after arbitration rulings against the union
although all his arbitrated settlements involved nominal raises, and most real raises.
Other forms of sample selection are possible, though. For example, if the wage bill is
held too highthrough downward rigidity, the rm might need to reduce employment,
implying the sample of continuing workers would have above-average ability.
To nd out if selection is a¤ecting results, sample selection models were estimated.
Selection into the estimating sample was captured by a probit model, with the dichoto-
mous dependent variable taking value 1 if the worker was employed last period and
this, did not change job (so excluding promotions and grade changes), job characteris-
tics did not change (as dened in Section II), and data to estimate the job satisfaction
equation were available. The selection variable took value 0 if the worker was employed
last period but was in a di¤erent job with the same employer (including promotions
and grade changes), or was in the same job but job characteristics or work conditions
13Recall that I have already removed large pay changes likely due to error by trimming pay growth
(see section II). Full results for this section are not reported here but are available in a web Appendix
at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jennifersmith.
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changed, or was with a di¤erent employer, or was not employed this period. The models
were estimated using a two-step method whereby a quadratic in the inverse Millsratio
derived from a rst stage selection probit was included in a xed e¤ects satisfaction
equation (including pay and pay growth, and dummies for nonlinear earnings growth
e¤ects). Identication was ensured by the inclusion of additional variables in the se-
lection probits, where the identifying regressors were jointly signicant in the selection
equation (and, in a separate test, were found jointly insignicant when included in the
job satisfaction equation).14 Using a Wald test for the joint signicance of a quadratic
in the inverse Mills ratio in the satisfaction equation, independence of selection and
job satisfaction equations could not be rejected (p-values 0:61 for earnings and 0:22 for
hourly wage), although the inverse Millsratio was individually signicant at 10% for
the hourly wage sample.15 The selection-correctedestimates continued to show positive
impacts on job satisfaction from pay and pay growth (the latter dominated by a step
jump at the median in the case of earnings). Thus sample selection does not appear to
inuence results.
I now turn to the question of whether results are driven by measurement error in
pay. Does the relationship between satisfaction, pay and pay growth reect the reality,
as suggested by Akerlof et al. (1996), that many nominal cuts are spurious, being due
to measurement error in earnings levels?
Measurement error was examined by looking at two specic types of subsample that
14Identifying variables were chosen on intuitive and theoretical grounds as those which might inuence
the probability of remaining in the same job but not a¤ect job satisfaction directly. The set of variables
di¤ered slightly between basic wage and earnings to ensure identifying conditions were met, and included
the regional (Claimant Count) unemployment rate and percentage changes in unemployment rate, log
regional gross value added per capita and its rst di¤erence, dummies for whether the workers spouse
was employed, house tenure (private renting and renting from local authority  council housing 
with base case home ownership) and log non-labour income. In all cases, a test of joint exclusion
of the identifying regressors in the job satisfaction equation could not be rejected (with signicance
level 40% or larger) and their joint insignicance in the selection probit could be rejected at <0.001%
level. Observations on non-stayers numbered 27,402. Because the identifying variables were found
independent of job satisfaction, in principle they might be used to instrument pay and pay growth
to control for endogeneity. However, although strongly correlated with the event of staying in a job,
they proved less related to pay; and using them in xed e¤ects instrumental regressions rendered pay
variables insignicant.
15It is possible that, on average, non-stayers might e¤ectively not di¤er much from stayers, due to
heterogeneity among non-stayers: non-stayers include a substantial proportion of voluntary movers and
those who were promoted, as well as involuntary or disadvantagedjob leavers.
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are very likely free of measurement error. The rst type of subsample consists of those
cases where the interviewer has documentary evidence on pay, or where the basic rate
is known exactly. Within the BHPS there is information about whether the pay slip
 given to the worker by the employer as a record of pay  was checked when the
interview response on pay was given. The pay slip was examined in both years relevant
to the pay change by 22% of the earnings sample. Many hourly-paid workers will not
receive a pay slip; only 16% inspect it in both years. For hourly-paid workers, there
is a second check: there is information about whether the wage rate stated is known
exactlyor estimated. 60% state an exact amount in both years relevant to the wage
change. The relatively low proportions whose pay slip is checked clearly give rise to
concerns about selection, and indeed comparisons of means show that those who check
pay slip are older and so have higher pay but slower pay growth; other features also di¤er
signicantly between checkers and non-checkers. So, although the checker subsample
gives information about the satisfactionpay growth relationship that is relatively free
of the inuence of measurement error, inference needs to be conned to this subsample.
The second type of subsample consists of data since the introduction of computer-
assisted Dependent Interviewing (DI) in 2006 (Wave 16), which should have helped
clean data of earnings change errors. An earnings check question is now triggered when
the computer-aided comparison of last years hourly earnings with this years indicates
a nominal cut bigger than 30% or nominal raise bigger than 40% (for stayers, or 60%
for movers), which means that waves 16 and 17 should be free of large earnings change
errors.
Results from error-free subsamples give no real grounds to doubt full-sample ndings,
and are rather disparate. In the payslip-check subsamples, both basic wage and earnings
e¤ects are purely dynamic (for earnings, this dynamic e¤ect being dominated by a step
jump), and the pay growth e¤ect is substantially bigger in these error-free subsamples.
However, when the basic wage is stated exactly it is only the basic wage level that
is signicant, and no pay growth e¤ect is signicant after DI was introduced. Rather
surprisingly, the excess happiness of those with large earnings cuts remains in all error-
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free subsamples.
Overall, therefore, robustness checks suggest that measurement error does not appear
to systematically inuence the results.
IV. Conclusion
If fairness considerations are important in wage-setting, there will be heterogeneity in
the response of workers to pay cuts. Building up a picture of the empirical regularities
underlying this heterogeneity will allow us to predict when pay cuts will occur (without
adverse morale consequences).
There are several key ndings. The rst is a basic one: the signicant impact of pay
growth on job satisfaction is consistent with workers using past pay as a referent.
Second, there is what has been termed an insult e¤ect by Bewley (1999) or a
winning is the only thinge¤ect by Mas (2006): there is a step-reduction in satisfaction
for earnings cuts and below-median earnings growth generally. Beyond this, though,
there is no evidence of loss aversion.
Third, reaction to pay cuts depends on the perceived fairness of the pay change.
Real cuts (and below-median increases generally) that do not involve a nominal cut only
signicantly adversely a¤ect morale if two conditions apply: if similar other workers
are enjoying raises and the workers industry is expanding. Dissatisfaction when pay
growth does not reect good industry performance could reect workersdisgruntlement
at apparently unfair treatment by the rm, in accordance with the gift exchange model.
One interpretation of the insult e¤ect is that there is an implicit or explicit contract
that the wage should increase with the general wage trend, and that the nominal wage
should not fall, as suggested by Holden and Wulfsberg (2008, 2009). The insult e¤ect
might be a perceived break, or change, of that contract.
A related explanation for the insult e¤ect, and its heterogeneity, emphasises expec-
tations as a reference point (Abeler et al. 2011). Looked at in this way, what this paper
begins to do is identify forces driving expectation formation. Results show formally
what many would intuitively suspect: that expectations of pay depend in part on ones
own past pay, and that expectations of pay change are inuenced by how similar other
19
workers are faring in the labour market and how ones company is doing, capturing
shocks to labour supply and productivity. Satisfaction responds adversely to a fall in
pay and pay growth relative to expectations. Crawford and Meng (2011) nd e¤ects
similar to the inuence of median pay growth found here: they found sample average
pay, proxying expectations or the general trend in wages, inuential in determining the
point at which New York cab drivers choose to stop work and, as here, much of the
e¤ect was in the form of a jumponce the expectation (or reference point) was reached.
Further work in laboratory or eld to distinguish between fairness, contract, and expec-
tations e¤ects in reference point models could usefully illuminate empirical results and
help unite sometimes disconnected literatures.
A further key nding of this paper is that nominal cuts are disliked unless cuts
are universal (even when industry output is declining), providing further morale-based
motivation for downward nominal rigidity. These results are similar to those of Cohn
et al. (2011), whose eld experiment showed that e¤ort falls when a worker su¤ers a
nominal pay cut not experienced by others.
The general support found for the importance of gift exchange and social prefer-
ences might surprise some familiar with sceptical views (e.g. Levitt and List 2007).
Results imply that we can get closer to understanding wage rigidity and how it varies
by acknowledging the importance of fairness and comparisons in the labour market.
There is, of course, still a great deal of work to be done. Data covering many workers
in the same rm, and including rm performance information and job satisfaction, would
allow a more accurate assessment of the importance of fairness concerns. Such data are
rare. Simple conrmation of this papers ndings from British data in other typical
survey datasets would be useful. Results also suggest there is scope for ner tests in
eld and laboratory; at present, the number of studies investigating interactions between
changes in own pay and either other workerspay changes or rm surplus is very small.
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Data Appendix
The BHPS data used in this paper were made available through the UK Data Archive.
The data were originally collected by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change
at the University of Essex, now incorporated within the Institute for Social and Eco-
nomic Research. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
Industry performance is measured by real output per capita (volume measure, at
2005 prices) for 33 industries, according to their 2-digit 1992 Standard Industrial Classi-
cation. During the sample period the BHPS classication system changed, and coding
frames from the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS) are used to recode SIC80 to SIC92
(see Standard Industrial Classication of Economic Activities: Mapping of SIC (80)
to SIC (92) and Mapping of SIC (92) to SIC (80), OOSS User Guide 1990: 09, May
2003, Occupational Information Unit at the ONS). For manufacturing industries, indus-
try performance data are matched to BHPS data according to month of interview. For
other industries, data are matched according to quarter of interview.
The overalljob satisfaction question is asked during the interview. It follows four
questions relating to satisfaction with particular aspects of the job: Im going to read
out a list of various aspects of jobs, and for each one Id like you to tell me from this card
which number best describes how satised or dissatised you are with that particular
aspect of your own present job... 1 The total pay, including any overtime and bonuses;
2 Your job security; 3 The actual work itself; 4 The hours you work.The interviewer
shows the respondent a card with the following verbal labels attached to the seven
possible numerical responses: 7=Completely satised, 6=Mostly satised, 5=Somewhat
satised, 4=Neither satised nor dissatised, 3=Somewhat dissatised, 2=Mostly dis-
satised, 1=Completely dissatised. The overall job satisfaction question follows: All
things considered, how satised or dissatised are you with your present job overall using
the same 1-7 scale?. (Waves A to G, 1991-1997, included three additional job satis-
faction domains: promotion prospects, relations with superiors and initiative.) The job
satisfaction questions are asked in the Employmentsection of the interview and follow
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simple factual questions on employment status, industry, occupation, employer, duties,
hours of work and travel to work. The satisfaction questions immediately precede ques-
tions on pay, so reports and any interaction concerning pay will not inuence reported
job satisfaction although respondents familiar with the interview structure might have
in mind, or have specically recalled, their pay and pay history in preparation for those
questions.
I exclude any job stayerwho, despite reporting no job change, also reports a change
between full- and part-time status, between temporary/contract/xed-term/seasonal
and permanent status, between public and private sectors, and between either of man-
agerial or supervisory positions and other. I also omit those whose location of work alters
(between employers premises and other locations). Excluding these observations is nu-
merically important: 28% of the sample is a¤ected (for both hourly-paid and salaried
workers).
In Section III I check robustness using pay-slip and additional basic hourly wage
checks. The BHPS questionnaire emphasises RESPONDENT TO CHECK PAY SLIP
IF POSSIBLE, and whether the respondent checked the latest or an earlier pay slip
is recorded. The precise wording for the additional basic wage check is What is your
hourly rate of pay for your basic hours of work? WRITE IN AMOUNT PER HOUR. IF
EXACT AMOUNT NOT KNOWN ENTER APPROXIMATE AMOUNT AND CODE
Estimated amountBELOW. Almost all (96%) of pay slip checkers state an exact
amount for basic wage.
I also check robustness using the introduction of Dependent Interviewing during
the sample period, which entails a computer-prompted earnings check of large earnings
changes. The post-DI sample comprises around one fth of the total. On the basis of
previous waves, Jäckle et al. (2007) report that the earnings check question would have
been posed to around 10% of respondents. The earnings check question, which is asked
in relation to net pay if possible or gross pay if not, is: So your [net] pay has gone
<UP/DOWN> since last time we interviewed you, from <CONVERTED AMOUNT>
per <PERIOD> for a <TOTALHOURS> hour work week (including overtime), to
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<AMOUNT STATED THIS YEAR> per <PERIOD>, is that correct? (Yes / No /
Dont Know or Other).Respondents not conrming that the pay change was correct
are asked for a verbatim explanation of the recorded pay change. Jäckle, Lynn and
Uhrig (2007) mention big promotions as a possible explanatory factor, but state that
they expect the reason to be data entry error in either wave, such as mis-recording
pay period as month rather than year. Ultimately, this DI application is designed to
enhance data quality by reducing the number of outliers that can be di¢ cult to deal
with during analysis(p.12). Unfortunately neither an indicator for when the check was
applied nor a record of the verbatim response are included in the released BHPS data.
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Table 1: Impact of pay and pay changes on overall job satisfaction
Pay measure Earnings Hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Real pay 0.129 0.143 0.210 0.413
(0.022)*** (0.028)*** (0.095)** (0.153)***
Real pay growth 0.084 0.212
(0.025)*** (0.117)*
ln Hours -0.262 -0.185 -0.043 -0.026
(0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.053) (0.069)
ln Lagged hours -0.129 -0.043
(0.031)*** (0.070)
Observations 46,263 44,931 10,374 8,601
Individuals 11,837 11,678 4,332 3,611
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of overall job satisfaction (continuous variable
created by probit adjustment). Coe¢ cients are from xed e¤ects models. Asymptotic standard
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on individuals. Signicance is indicated at
the following levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The pay measure in columns (1) and (2) is real
gross usual weekly earnings (observed for all workers from 1991 to 2007). Hours are total
normal weekly hours (normal standard hours plus normal overtime hours). The pay measure
in columns (3) and (4) is the real hourly basic wage rate (observed for hourly-paid workers,
and available from 1999 to 2007). Controls include a dummy for health problems, age squared,
number of children aged 16 or below; tenure squared and a dummy for missing values of tenure,
eight employment size dummies; dummies for the presence of the respondents partner and for
poor cooperation by the respondent during the interview; year dummies (fteen for earnings
and seven for hourly wage rate).
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Table 2: SupF-type statistics for breaks in the job satisfactionpay growth relationship
Test Earnings Hourly wage Critical values
SupF Location SupF (1%, 5%, 10%)
Single intercept break 27.30 1.5% 3.74 (13.58, 9.63, 8.02)
Single slope break 23.33 -24.1% 1.35 (13.58, 9.63, 8.02)
Slope break given intercept break at 1:5% 14.38 -24.1% (15.03, 11.14, 9.56)
Intercept break given slope break at  24:1% 16.50 1.5% (15.03, 11.14, 9.56)
Intercept break given intercept break at 1:5% 15.37 -24.1% (15.03, 11.14, 9.56)
Slope break given slope break at  24:1% 7.19 (15.03, 11.14, 9.56)
Joint intercept and slope break 18.45 1.0% 1.87 (16.64, 12.89, 11.02)
Notes: Tests are the Multiple Break and Sequential Break tests of Bai and Perron (1998)
(essentially identical to the SupF tests of Andrews 1993 when there is a single break). Critical
values are taken from Andrews (1993) Table I, p.840, Bai and Perron (1998) Tables I and II,
pp.58 and 61, with 5% trimming.
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Table 3: Nonlinearities in the relationship between satisfaction and earnings growth
(1) (2)
ln Real pay level 0.154 0.154
(0.028)*** (0.028)***
Real pay growth 0.058 0.061
(0.036)* (0.037)*
Pay growth dummies:
(Base) Above-median pay growth 0.000 0.000
(N/A) (N/A)
Below-median pay growth -0.042
(0.010)***
Below-median real raise -0.033
(0.016)**
Real cut but nominal raise -0.047
(0.015)***
Nominal freeze -0.053
(0.016)***
Nominal cut -0.039
(0.013)***
Real earnings growth  Below  24.1% -0.246 -0.241
(0.065)*** (0.065)***
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of overall job satisfaction. The pay measure
is real gross weekly earnings. Coe¢ cients are from xed e¤ects models, with asymptotic
standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering on individuals. Both regressions use
44,931 observations on 11,678 individuals. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. For details of
controls, see notes to Table 1.
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Table 5: Interactions with industry perfomance and other workerspay
(1) (2)
Coe¤. S.E. Coe¤. S.E.
ln Real pay level 0.214 (0.040)*** 0.216 (0.043)***
ln Lagged own real pay level -0.060 (0.037)* -0.063 (0.038)*
Pay growth dummies and interactions:
(Base) Real pay growth above median 0.000 (N/A) 0.000 (N/A)
Below-median pay growth
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay rises -0.042 (0.011)***
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay falls 0.023 (0.033)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay rises -0.053 (0.015)***
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay falls -0.032 (0.057)
Below-median real raise
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay rises -0.039 (0.018)**
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay falls 0.094 (0.062)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay rises -0.044 (0.034)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay falls 0.137 (0.118)
Real cut but nominal raise
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay rises -0.055 (0.017)***
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay falls 0.027 (0.053)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay rises -0.037 (0.028)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay falls 0.040 (0.088)
Nominal freeze
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay rises -0.056 (0.019)***
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay falls -0.063 (0.075)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay rises -0.033 (0.030)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay falls -0.107 (0.138)
Nominal cut
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay rises -0.034 (0.014)**
 Real industry output rises  Real comparison pay falls 0.023 (0.046)
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay rises -0.066 (0.021)***
 Real industry output falls  Real comparison pay falls -0.095 (0.083)
Real earnings growth  Below  24.1% -0.243 (0.066)*** -0.239 (0.066)***
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of job satisfaction. The pay measure is real
gross weekly earnings. The regressions use 44,236 observations covering 11,612 individuals.
Coe¢ cients are from xed e¤ects models, with asymptotic standard errors (in parentheses)
adjusted for clustering on individuals. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. See also notes to
Table 1.
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Figure 1: Tests of single change in (a) the intercept and (b) the slope of the job satisfaction
earnings growth relationship
Critical values:
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Real gross earnings growth
Breakpoint candidate
Test for single break in:
Intercept Slope
Notes: F -statistics test the null of insignicant change in intercept or slope coe¢ cient of the
job satisfactionpay growth relationship at the relevant breakpoint. Nonlinearity is detected
if the maximal F -statistic exceeds the SupF critical values (obtained from Andrews, 1993, or
Bai and Perron 1998), and in that case nonlinearity is located at the maximum.
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